Author: Acquire@pos

The most severe form of avak rechilus involves statements that reveal information which was told in confidence. (Sharing confidential information to save someone from harm will be discussed later.) Divulging secrets breeds a lack of self control in speech-related matters which leads to actual rechilus.

When publicizing a secret could prove damaging, doing so would constitute speaking both avak rechilus and actual loshon hora. Even when no damage was foreseen, the mere violation of confidentiality renders one a “holech rochil,” gossipmonger.

To cause outright animosity between Jews is to speak rechilus; to effect a minor degree of ill feeling between Jews is to speak Avak Rechilus. An example of the latter is where one relates that someone spoke about the listener in a manner which is neither derogatory nor harmful, but which may cause the listener to be disappointed with that individual. The classic example of this is where Hashem spoke critically to Avraham of Sarah for her having expressed incredulity upon hearing an angel (disguised as a wayfarer) say that she would bear a child. Hashem said, “Why did Sarah laugh, to say, ‘Shall I in truth bear a child, though I have aged?’ ” (Bereishis 18:13). In fact, Sarah had said, “And my husband is old.” (V. 12). Talmud Yerushalmi (Pe’ah 1:1) states that to repeat such a statement would be to speak avak rechilus. Now, to say that a man of ninety-nine is old is neither derogatory nor damaging. However, it is a bit discomforting for a person of advanced age to hear that his spouse speaks of him as an “old man;” therefore, to report such a remark is to speak avak rechilus.

When seeking a person’s assistance, be it financial or otherwise, one may not mention that he knows of others who received similar assistance from this individual – unless the individual is known to appreciate the publicizing of that fact.

This rule is based on the concern that a person may not want his charitable acts to become public knowledge, as this could bring about an endless barrage of requests for his assistance. By mentioning his having made a contribution to a certain person, one reveals that the recipient shared the information with others – which may cause the donor to be upset with that recipient.

When reference to the recipient is made to bolster one’s own request and not to cause animosity, it is categorized as avak rechilus.

When sincerely praising an individual’s generosity in the presence of others, one should not do so in a way that may cause his family or business partner to be upset with him for having been charitable at their expense. Acknowledging a major donation in the presence of the donor’s spouse or offspring may arouse feelings on his or her part that the family’s money is being mishandled. If the recipient had good intentions only, he would be guilty of speaking avak rechilus.

It is forbidden to tell someone, “I’d rather not tell you what so-and-so said about you,” for this is implying that “so-and-so” said something negative about the listener. If the speaker honestly – though naively – intended to avoid speaking rechilus, he violated only the rabbinical prohibition of “avak rechilus.” However, if the implication was intentional, then the remark is classified as outright rechilus and he has transgressed the Scriptural prohibition.

One who does not exercise proper caution in matters of speech may find himself inadvertently fanning the flames of hatred. It is forbidden to mention an incident or other piece of information which might remind the listener of a situation where he was wronged by someone. To relate such information is to speak avak (lit, the dust of) rechilus. The speaker transgresses even though he has no intent of causing the listener to recall the wrongdoing; the Sages hold the speaker responsible for not having exercised proper caution in mentioning that which might reawaken ill feelings.

There are situations where refusal to answer a question would itself be a transgression of the prohibition against speaking rechilus. When, for example, one is asked whether or not a certain individual was the guilty party in a certain incident, remaining silent is no less revealing than an explicit “yes.” Here, halachah requires one to conceal the facts, and simply say “no.”

The obvious question is: Why is lying preferable to speaking rechilus when both are prohibited by the Torah? To answer this, we must gain a better understanding of the commandment, “Distance yourself from falsehood” (Shemos 23:7).

The Talmud (Shevuos 31a) notes that rather than command us, “Do not lie,” the Torah instructs us to distance ourselves from “falsehood.” In determining whether or not a given statement is “falsehood,” one must examine its end result more than its technical accuracy. A “little white lie,” for example, which is technically correct but intentionally misleading, is falsehood.

Maharal explains that the Torah views personal animosity as a form of falsehood. This attitude is clearly expressed by the Sages’ classic term for animosity: sinas chinam, baseless hatred.

Thus, a statement of rechilus which could be cause for sinas chinam is a potential cause of falsehood – and concealing or altering the facts to avoid rechilus is an advancement of the cause of truth. In the Sages’ words, “One may alter the facts for the sake of peace” (see Rashi to Bereishis 50:16).

It must be noted, however, that under no circumstances may one swear falsely – even for the sake of peace.

As with any Torah prohibition, one may not speak rechilus even when he was asked to do so by someone who will be upset by his refusal to comply and has the power to do him damage. One must be prepared to suffer embarrassment, jeopardize his social status, or even lose his job in order to avoid speaking rechilus.

As with other forms of forbidden speech, one may not speak rechilus upon the request of a parent, teacher, or rav, except when it is necessary l’toeles, for a constructive purpose (see below).

A statement which can be interpreted by the listener to mean that one party acted or spoke against another is rechilus even though this was not the speaker’s interpretation of that which he recounted. Such information may be related only if the speaker makes it clear that no harm was intended AND the listener is not known to be one who is likely draw his own negative conclusions.

As with other forms of loshon hora, halachah does not differentiate between rechilus that is stated explicitly or merely implied. A statement in which names are omitted is still rechilus if the listener can deduce the identities of the people involved. Also, it is forbidden to communicate rechilus through body motion, sign language or any other means. Likewise, it is forbidden to make available written or recorded material if awareness of its contents could create ill feelings between individuals.

The prohibition against speaking rechilus may apply even if the listener is already aware of the information being conveyed. Rechilus includes any statement which may foster animosity; repeating how someone maligned or acted against the listener might make the listener better aware of details that would be cause for added hatred. Moreover, if the listener had not yet given much thought to the information, repeating it could be cause for animosity to form.

Included in the prohibition against speaking rechilus is relating information which might ultimately cause ill will if it were to be passed on to a certain person or persons.

Therefore, it is forbidden to say anything to anyone that might cause animosity between any two people. One must assume that whatever is told to even one person is likely to be repeated to others – and could ultimately be heard by just about anybody. Only if the listener is warned not to tell anyone what he is about to hear, and can be trusted to heed this warning, would it be permitted to share such information with him (provided, of course, that the information is not of a derogatory nature; otherwise, it would be loshon hora).

As rechilus is defined as any statement that may cause ill feelings between Jews, one might think that statements where ill feelings already exist would be excluded from this category. In fact, this is not the case. It is forbidden to strengthen existent animosity or even to remind someone of his negative feelings towards his fellow.

It is forbidden to relate to a member of a community, family or organization that someone spoke cynically of his group; to do so is to speak rechilus. This is true even when members of that community, family, or organization regularly joke about themselves. It is common for people to poke fun at themselves, yet be offended when others make similar comments.

The same applies regarding a school. Students who regularly joke about their school or class are often offended when outsiders make similar comments. Therefore, mentioning to students that someone spoke negatively of their school is speaking rechilus.

[It should be noted that joking about one’s own school generally involves loshon hora or at least avak loshon hora.]

It is reasonable to assume that people dislike those who speak badly of their friends or relatives. Therefore, to tell an individual that someone has spoken negatively of his friend or relative is to speak rechilus.

An important application of this law is in the case of children. We have learned that one may speak of a child’s mischievous behavior if neither the speaker nor the listener will think any less of the child as a result of the incident. Since the Torah deems children culpable for their actions only in a limited sense, their misbehavior is considered shameful only if people view it as such. Nevertheless, it is common for a parent or grandparent to feel ill will toward someone who tells others of his child’s or grandchild’s misbehavior. Therefore, to inform a parent or grandparent that someone told of their child’s misbehavior is to speak rechilus.

As rechilus includes any statement that might cause ill feelings between Jews, it is forbidden to inform a manufacturer or distributor that a certain individual dislikes his product. This is true even if the product is generally unpopular. Similarly, one may not tell a speaker that a certain person or persons did not enjoy his lecture, nor may one tell a writer or artist that certain people do not appreciate his work (unless this is absolutely necessary for a constructive purpose).

The prohibition against speaking rechilus is highly relevant when a committee meets to consider an individual for possible enrollment in a school, employment in a firm, or appointment to a communal or organizational position. Whether or not the final outcome is in the person’s favor, it is forbidden to divulge the identity of anyone who expressed an opinion against the person. It is wrong for a member of the committee to tell the candidate, “I was on your side but was outvoted by my colleagues.”

The same would apply when a beis din (rabbinical court) considers a case and comes to a decision against a party. It is forbidden for any of the judges to state that the ruling was unanimous, or which judges sided with which party, or to even say, “I voted in your favor but was outnumbered,” for it is natural for people to harbor ill will toward those who ruled against them.

Speaking rechilus is prohibited even when it is made clear that the act committed was totally justified. It is therefore forbidden to tell someone that another person spoke negatively of him for a constructive purpose (l’toeles). Moreover, it is forbidden to tell someone that another person spoke negatively of him upon the advice of a posek (halachic authority). People tend to bear ill will towards those who speak against them even when it is obvious that the speaker was justified in doing so.

While the verse “Do not go as a gossipmonger among your people” (Vayikra 19:16), prohibits all forms of loshon hora, the term “gossipmonger,” refers specifically to rechilus, information that potentially can cause ill will between Jews. Whereas loshon hora that is derogatory can cause others to lose respect for the subject, rechilus can cause damage to relationships between the subject and his fellow Jews.

It is forbidden to tell someone that an individual: did something to harm him; spoke loshon hora against him; doesn’t like him; or doesn’t respect him, since such statements would, in all probability, cause the listener to feel ill will towards that individual.

The standard order of teshuvah (repentance) for sins between man and God is: confession, regret and resolution never to repeat the act in the future. One who willfully listened as someone related loshon hora is required to engage in this process.

If one actually believed the loshon hora, then the above steps must be preceded by a successful effort at convincing oneself that the information was not accurate. This applies even when the halachah permits listening to the information for a constructive purpose but does not permit believing it as fact.
Generally, sins between man and his fellow require that one ask forgiveness. However, this does not apply when one has accepted loshon hora. So long as the listener has not acted on the basis of the report in any way that was harmful to the subject, there is no need to approach the person for forgiveness. In fact, the person should not be informed that loshon hora was spoken about him, as it would serve no purpose other than to hurt his feelings, and may involve rechilus (speech which causes hatred – See Day 118).

The prohibition of accepting loshon hora does not apply when the subject is known to regularly engage in the negative behavior under discussion. Thus, if on a number of occasions one has personally witnessed an individual commit a particular sin, he would be permitted to believe that the person committed that sin again. The Chofetz Chaim seems to suggest that one would even be permitted to believe the person has committed a different sin. When a person is known to totally disregard the Torah and its mitzvos one may certainly accept a report that he committed any sin.

If one is known to regularly transgress a particular sin out of temptation, one would be allowed to believe that he transgressed it again, but would be required to reject a claim that this time it was done maliciously.

The Torah does not accept circumstantial evidence as proof of a person’s guilt. Thus, when one suspects an individual of improper behavior, he may not decide that his suspicions are correct based on the person’s reactions to accusations or other strange behavior that strongly points to his guilt.

Nevertheless if, in addition to the circumstantial evidence, such suspicions are subsequently supported by someone else’s claim to have actually witnessed the person engaging in such behavior, one does have the right to believe that his suspicions are correct.

However, to whatever degree possible, the listener is still obliged to judge the perpetrator favorably; he must seek to understand his motives and should not be swift to condemn him.

Moreover, one may not pass on the information without fulfilling the preconditions for relating negative information for a constructive purpose.

There are times when halacha accepts as fact “innocent” remarks, i.e. statements made in passing without the speaker being aware of the consequences of his words. As a rule, people do not lie unnecessarily, so that when a person does not realize that he is saying something of significance, it can be assumed that he is telling the truth.

Halacha grants such statements the status of testimony in two instances:

1) Where it is certain that ultimately the true story will be revealed to all. People do not fabricate tales when it is clear that their lies will be revealed as such.

2) To establish that an individual is no longer alive.

“Innocent” negative statements are not granted any such legitimacy. They are loshon hora and one is not permitted to believe them.

We have already seen that one may not believe even his spouse or close confidants when they relate negative information about others. At most, he may consider the possibility that the information might be true.

The Talmud states that one exception to this rule is where the listener considers the speaker to be a man of unusual integrity whose words are weighed very carefully. Such a person can be trusted to relate an incident exactly as it happened, to the extent that the listener can consider himself as having witnessed it, and thus may accept the report as fact. Nevertheless, since the decision that the speaker is trustworthy is a personal one made by the listener, he cannot pass the information on to others as if he had witnessed it – even for a constructive purpose.

The Chofetz Chaim is of the opinion that today no one can claim to have the degree of integrity necessary for his words to be accepted as fact, and it is therefore forbidden for anyone to believe a negative statement on the basis of someone else’s report.

Halacha allows for certain rumors to be reckoned with, but never are they to be accepted as fact.

It is important to note the halachik qualifications which distinguish a rumor that may have some credence from that which is mere character assassination. If the subject is known to have enemies in the community who are very possibly the source of the rumors, it may not be granted any legitimacy. Even if everyone in the community has a favorable opinion of the subject, the rumor would have to circulate throughout the community for one and a half days without losing strength before it could be taken seriously.

When a rumor does seem to have validity, halacha allows for it to cast doubt on the status of the person(s) involved; e.g. where the report concerns the subject’s status as a kohen or similar issues of lineage.

The unfortunate reality is that rarely is a rumor anything more than wide-scale loshon hora. Even when halacha grants a rumor some degree of validity, it cannot be accepted as fact.

Loshon hora initiated by children and accepted as fact by their believing parents is often a cause of major injustice. It happens all too often that one or two key students in a class arbitrarily take a disliking to their teacher and stories are exaggerated and circulated. Well-meaning parents accept their children’s accounts of the going-on at school and before long the teacher finds himself struggling to defend his position.

As every adult knows, student dissatisfaction is not necessarily an indication of a teacher’s inadequacy as an educator. The students’ version of a situation must be considered but not accepted as fact. A thorough and discreet investigation – one which does not cause the teacher embarrassment – must be conducted before a teacher is declared at fault.

A teacher too, must avoid believing accusations directed by students against one another. Here, too, an investigation is called for, and unless the facts can be established, no action should be taken.

We have learned that speaking negatively for the sake of one’s own emotional well-being is an acceptable form of constructive speech. It is reasonable for one to express anger and frustration about an individual to one’s parent, spouse or mentor to obtain sympathy, reassurance and advice, and it is the obligation of the listener to provide such support.

However, even in such situations, the listener may not decide in his own mind that the report is true, for as far as he is concerned, the information is only secondhand. It is therefore imperative that the following understanding exist between those who take part in such discussions:

Halacha permits one to occasionally “let off steam” and express his frustrations to someone else. However, it is obvious that one who is involved in a disagreement to the point of anger, or considers himself the victim of verbal abuse, lacks the ability to be objective. Any negativity expressed under such circumstances is to be understood as a description of the speaker’s feelings and not as an accurate account of what actually took place.

In this way, a husband and wife or close friends can rely on one another for emotional support without transgressing the laws of proper speech.

We have seen that a derogatory statement about someone is not to be believed as fact even for a constructive purpose. One is to take the necessary precautions without changing his attitude towards the subject.

We have also learned that to cause another Jew to transgress is to violate the prohibition, “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block.”

Consequently, when one relates negative information for a constructive purpose, he must be careful not to cause the listener to sin by believing the information as fact.

The proper way to convey negative information for a constructive purpose is to preface it with a statement such as, “Don’t take my word for it – I may be mistaken – but do take the matter under serious consideration”.

The Talmud (Niddah 61a) makes it clear that although negative information should not be accepted as fact, one can and should act to protect himself and others on the chance that it may be true. Just as it is naïve and wrong to believe the loshon hora one hears, so too it is naïve and irresponsible to totally ignore a report which could save oneself or others from possible harm or anguish.

On a personal level, one’s relationship with the subject of the negative report should not change. Chances are the statement was inaccurate, if not altogether false. One’s behavior towards the individual should, therefore, not be affected at all, and one should continue to show him kindness and assist him as in the past. On a practical level, one should investigate the matter and protect himself against any possible harm that could result should the report prove true.

If, for example, one hears that an acquaintance is dishonest, it is forbidden to think of him as such – but one should keep his wallet in a safe place when that person is around! If one is told that a person who accepts charity is actually well-to-do, one should not stop assisting him until the matter has been investigated and it has been determined beyond doubt that he is not deserving of assistance.

The fact that a derogatory statement was made for a constructive purpose does not permit the listener to accept it as fact. It is permissible to listen to negative information for toeles, a constructive purpose; however, it is not permissible to believe such information. One may act upon such information on the possibility that it might be true.

It is for this reason that the first precondition for speaking constructively (Day 50) is that one have firsthand knowledge of the negative information he is conveying. Since one cannot believe derogatory information as fact, he cannot present it to others as such. In situations where it is permissible to relate secondhand information one is required to say that he heard it from others and could not be sure of it’s accuracy (see Day 71).

The commandment Do not accept a false report, prohibits the acceptance as fact of any negative statement concerning a person or group of persons. Accurate interpretation of a person’s actions and/or words demands thorough knowledge of the setting in which the action occurred and the events which led up to it, an understanding of the person’s mindset and manner of speech, and much sensitivity. This is obviously impossible unless one has witnessed the action and accompanying remarks. Reliance on the sensitivity, objectivity, integrity and wisdom of an alleged observer of an improper act is rejected by the Torah as foolish and wrong. Certainly, if the speaker is committing the sin of speaking loshon hora, his integrity is suspect and one cannot accept his words as true and accurate. By Torah law, only the testimony of two valid witnesses accepted by a beis din (rabbinical court) can be believed as fact.

As we have seen, it is forbidden to listen to negative information in any situation where the speaker is transgressing by relating the information. As it is not permissible to speak loshon hora about a non-observant Jew unless he is classified as an apikores (heretic), it is forbidden to listen to loshon hora that is being spoken about him. As has already been noted, today the average non-observant Jew is classified as a “tinok she’nishba,” (lit., a child who was taken captive), a victim of ignorance and circumstances and not, God forbid, an apikores.

As mentioned above, to discuss the life-style of a particular non-observant Jew in order to teach others not to learn from his ways is considered speaking l’toeles, for a constructive purpose, and is permissible. It is therefore also permissible to listen to such a discussion.

Similarly, when an individual’s improper behavior is publicized as a way of pressuring him to mend his ways, it is correct to listen, for the goal will never be achieved if everyone chooses to ignore what is being said of the person.

It is a parent’s responsibility to sensitize his or her child to the evils of loshon hora and help the child to develop self-control in this area. At the same time, it is a parent’s responsibility to provide his or her child with emotional support and assistance. The overzealous parent can cause a child irreparable harm by forever scolding when reassurance is in order; however, failure to discipline one’s child is no less harmful. One must learn to discern between situations where a child is relating an incident because he needs his parent’s help, and when he is speaking loshon hora for no good reason.

A child should be taught that if interesting events of the day include negative facts about others, then names should be omitted. To relate how a certain child misbehaved in class is to speak loshon hora, even if what that child did was clever and amusing. Conversely, it is perfectly correct for a child to reveal the identity of a boy who interferes with his own activity or disrupts him during class time.

We have already seen that there are no grounds for sharing gossip with one’s spouse (Day 16). To view withholding loshon hora from one’s spouse as a breach of harmony and trust is mistaken. (A husband and wife who seek to have the Divine Presence dwell in their midst should build their home on the foundations of halacha and avoid conversations which promote strife and dissension among Jews.) Moreover, sharing negativity (e.g. information, feelings, etc.) does not help create a healthy, positive relationship.

Nevertheless, when a husband or wife is in need of emotional support in dealing with difficulty, it is only natural to look to one’s spouse for assistance. Speaking or listening under such circumstances is constructive and is clearly permissible.

When possible, one should attempt to help one’s spouse understand the situation in a way that would relieve his or her anger or frustration.

If one finds that his or her spouse is forever in need of “letting off steam,” it is important to try to bring about a general change of attitude through discussion, reading or audio material, or suggesting a meeting with a rabbi or other qualified individual.

A word of caution: While one must be prepared to hear out a spouse and offer emotional support when necessary, one must be ever vigilant not to be drawn into a conversation of loshon hora for no constructive purpose. It is often the case that couples fail to draw this distinction, and consequently totally ignore the laws of shmiras halashon when conversing.

In the cases discussed thus far, the determining factor in making it permissible to listen to negative speech was relevance. If the information is important, in a constructive sense, for the listener to hear, it is proper for him to give his attention to what is being spoken, and at times to even solicit such information.

There are times when halacha permits listening to negative information which is of no relevance to the listener or any of his acquaintances. Where the speaker feels the need to express his anger or frustration for relief of emotional pain, one is doing an act of chesed (kindness) by hearing the person out and expressing understanding of his feelings. If the listener feels that the speaker can be made to understand how he misjudged the person responsible for his frustration, he is obligated to do so. (Often, however, a person expressing his frustrations is in need of empathy and is not open to logic. At a later point, after the speaker has calmed down, the listener could approach him and attempt to explain how he may have misunderstood the situation.)

Care must be taken to keep the speaker from wandering from the matter at hand, and speaking irrelevantly about other faults of the one whom he feels has wronged him. Furthermore, one listening in such a situation must take care not to accept what he hears as fact.

As it is forbidden to cause another Jew to transgress, one may not solicit information unless it is clearly permissible for the other person to offer such information. Thus, in order to solicit information, the following conditions must be met:

(1) The person from whom information is being sought is not known to fabricate stories about others, to read into their behavior in an unjust manner, or to draw hurried conclusions about their character;

(2) And the person is not known to exaggerate in his descriptions of events;

(3) and it can be assumed that when informed that the information is necessary, he will not speak out of malice toward the subject; (thus, one may not seek information from a person who is not on good terms with the subject); and

(4) it is clear that the information is necessary for a constructive purpose, and that there is no alternative to soliciting such information.

In light of the above (see Day 98), if one must inquire about a person, family, community, or school in order to make an important decision, but does not want others to know what he is contemplating, he may not engage people in casual conversation with the aim of obtaining pertinent derogatory or harmful information. Unaware that his speech is constructive, the speaker is guilty of speaking loshon hora, and the listener who drew him into conversation has caused him to sin.

Thus, when soliciting necessary information, one must make it clear to the other person that circumstances permit this and that his response, therefore will not constitute loshon hora.

A common practice in such situations is not only to refrain from divulging the purpose of the inquiry, but also to inquire about several people at once, so as to conceal the fact that it is a particular person about whom one is seeking information. This is absolutely forbidden. The desire to protect one’s privacy does not justify irrelevant negative information and causing others to speak loshon hora.

While listening to negative information for constructive purposes is not a violation of the prohibition against accepting loshon hora, before taking the liberty of listening to such information one must be sure that he will not be guilty of causing the speaker to sin.

We have seen that in order to convey pertinent information that would otherwise be considered loshon hora several conditions must be met. For example, the speaker’s intent must be to bring about a positive result. If the speaker does not have constructive intent, his words are loshon hora, despite the fact that the information is important for the listener to hear. In such a case, being a listener would be a transgression of “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block” (Vayikra 19:14).

If one is privately doing business with someone and then, by coincidence, a friend begins speaking loshon hora about that very individual, one is required to interrupt him or walk away! Since the speaker is unaware that the listener is doing business with this person, the speaker is talking loshon hora and must be stopped. After interrupting him, one may tell him that the information he had begun to relate may be important to the listener, and that he may continue speaking provided that he can honestly relate it for that constructive purpose.

The prohibition, “Do not accept a false report” (see Day 91), teaches us that loshon hora should not be listened to and must not be accepted. However, when the information being conveyed is important to know for constructive reasons, it merits one’s attention and may be listened to. Just as relating negative information l’toeles, for a constructive purpose, is not considered speaking loshon hora, so too is listening for a constructive purpose considered responsible and proper.

Information that one may listen to includes anything that might help to prevent or correct undue harm to any individual, be it the listener, the speaker, the person spoken about, or another party. It would also include information that could help prevent or correct damage that is physical, financial, emotional or spiritual.

It is correct to listen to a person’s claim against someone else if one thinks that he can be of help in rectifying the situation, or if the listener or someone else might be vulnerable to similar treatment by the person being spoken about. It is permissible to listen to information about a person with whom one is planning to collaborate in a joint venture, if the information is pertinent to that relationship. In all of the above instances, the information is being listened to for a constructive purpose, and hence is not considered loshon hora.

The obligation to reprove one’s fellow Jew does not apply to a non-observant Jew who is in the category of a mumar (one who is aware of halachic requirements and ignores them – see Day 14). However, a non-observant Jew who sins out ignorance must be instructed gently regarding loshon hora. The beauty of shmiras halashon can be appreciated even by those whose observance level is minimal, and should be shared with them at the earliest opportunity.

Nevertheless, one does not rebuke a non-observant person with whom he does not have a relationship. It is obvious that such reproof will not convince the person to refrain from speaking loshon hora in the future, and will only serve to anger him. This would be similar to the situation (in Day 93) where reproof would cause worse sin to occur and is therefore inappropriate.

This rule holds true for an observant Jew as well. It is wrong to offer rebuke to someone with whom one has no real relationship, if it is clear that he will not change his ways and that he be offended by the person’s meddling in his affairs.

Rebuke in such a case would cause hatred and, possibly, even more loshon hora.

In situations where reproof is required (see Day 93), one is obligated to interrupt even his own parent who is speaking loshon hora and respectfully explain that he or she should not be speaking in this manner. A rav, as well, should not be allowed to speak loshon hora. However, it is disrespectful to accuse a rav of speaking loshon hora. Instead, one should ask the rav for assistance in understanding why it was permissible for him to make a given statement.

Children are not included in our obligation to reprove a fellow Jew who has sinned. However, parents, as well as teachers, are obligated in the mitzvah of chinuch, educating their charges in proper mitzvah observance. Thus, parents and teachers must train children from an early age to refrain from speaking or listening to loshon hora.

Based on the previous rules, it is clear that upon hearing loshon hora, one should promptly interrupt the speaker and reprimand him for his words. In a case where doing so would cause the speaker embarrassment (i.e. others are present), it is preferable that one tactfully change the subject, thus preventing the further speaking of loshon hora, and offer reproof later (in private).

If one finds himself unable to change the subject, he should walk away. While incapable of fulfilling his obligation to reprove, one must, nevertheless, avoid transgressing the sin of listening to loshon hora. If one feels uncomfortable leaving, the least he should do is try his best to ignore what is being said, and use facial expressions to show disapproval. Certainly, he should not appear as though he is enjoying the conversation.

One must train himself to defend his values, to be more concerned with truth than with his personal pride. Ultimately, one will find that the less he fears scorn and derision of scoffers, the more his self esteem will grow and his stature will grow in the eyes of others as well.

We have seen that one must reprove the speaker of loshon hora even if it is highly unlikely that the reproof will be effective.

When several people are involved in a discussion that includes loshon hora, one must speak up and caution them that what they are discussing is forbidden. However, unlike the case of an individual who speaks loshon hora, if the people ignore reproof, one should not persist in his rebuke unless he feels that his words might ultimately achieve a positive result. In an unreceptive group setting, it is wise to refrain from excessive reproof.

An exception to this rule is when one finds himself in a community where the prohibition of loshon hora has long been disregarded. Widespread disregard calls for more than ordinary reproof. It demands persistent protest, calling for an awareness of the severity of speaking loshon hora, and knowledge of what constitutes loshson hora.

The commandment, you shall reprove your fellow (Vayikra 19:17), requires a Jew to inform a sinner that his behavior is improper, and attempt to convince him to mend his ways. In voicing his disapproval, one must be prepared to endure embarrassment and insult and should continue to protest. Only in a case where one knows that his reproof would cause the sinner to react by committing more serious offenses is he to refrain from speaking up.

(Reproof must be administered with respect and understanding, and should be done in private whenever possible – see Rashi to Vayikra 19:17).

Generally speaking, one is required to interrupt and reprove the speaker of loshon hora, and do his best to ensure that he put a halt to his sinful speech. As mentioned, this does not apply when the speaker would likely react by expressing yet greater negativity towards the person he was speaking about, as a way of defending his sinful talk.

Another situation where reproof would be out of place is when:

The speaker does not realize that the information he is conveying is loshon hora, or is totally unaware that loshon hora is prohibited by the Torah; and
it is obvious that the speaker will continue speaking loshon hora even after being told that this is forbidden.

In such a case, reproof would transform the speaker from an inadvertent sinner into one who sins intentionally. Hence, it is better not to reprove him.

In addition to violating the prohibition against listening to loshon hora, every listener of loshon hora is, in effect, making it possible for the speaker to relate his forbidden words, and therefore is an accomplice in his sin.

In the case of a lone listener, the prohibition before a blind person do not place a stumbling block (Vayikra 19:14) would surely apply, for included in this verse is a prohibition against causing another Jew to sin. We will see that in certain instances listening to Loshon Hora is forbidden not because of the primary prohibition but because of the prohibition against causing another Jew to sin.

Not only is speaking loshon hora a lowly act not befitting the divine image in which man was created, but to listen as someone else speaks loshson hora is lowly as well. The Torah states, Do not accept a false report (Shemos 23:1). The Chofetz Chaim is apparently of the opinion that merely paying attention to loshon hora being spoken constitutes giving it some degree of credence, and is in violation of this prohibition.

Just as it is wrong to select the shortcomings of others as subject matter for one’s own speech, so too it is wrong for one to focus his attention on negativity being expressed by others.

Just as it is wrong to cause harm to others by way of speech, so too it is wrong to serve as a listener as potentially harmful information is being conveyed.

In short, derogatory or harmful speech should never earn one’s attention. Listening to loshon hora, even if one does not believe it, is in violation of Torah prohibition.

Returning now to our original three situations (Day 78), we may conclude that if one is aware of a negative factor that by objective standards renders the proposed relationship a mistake, he is obligated to speak up. However, if by objective standards the factor does not lead to such a conclusion, but it may adversely affect the future of the people involved, one should not volunteer information about it, but one would have to respond truthfully when questioned specifically regarding the topic under which that factor falls.

If by objective standards the factor would have no bearing on the relationship, but it is clear that the other party would see it as an issue, one should not volunteer information about it and should suggest that the relationship be pursued.

As a concluding note to this section, one must understand that the possible situations of constructive negative speech that could arise in the settings of family, friends, community, business, employment, education, etc. are endless. No book can possibly give explicit instructions for dealing with them all. One’s only recourse is to become fluent in the principles, develop an understanding of the concepts, and accustom himself to consulting a rav, so that he can meet the challenges that such situations bring with them.

One who knows of a shidduch in the making and has negative information about one of the parties has a responsibility – in certain cases – to offer this information without waiting to be asked.

The commandment “Do not stand aside while your brother’s blood is shed” (Vayikra 19:16) requires one to volunteer information if he is aware that one party in a proposed match has severe physical, psychological or spiritual shortcomings, which by objective standards can be expected to interfere with the marriage, and that this information is being concealed from the other party.

Once again, the conditions which permit speaking negatively for a constructive purpose must be fulfilled:

(1) The information must be firsthand or clearly stated as secondhand and not verified.

(2) It must clearly be a problem by objective standards (e.g. a debilitating disease in the person, or in the family if it is hereditary; severe psychological disorders; violent tendencies; major problems in hashkafa [outlook on basic issues of Jewish life]; an immoral lifestyle) and not a matter of personal opinion – even if one feels certain that this is not what the other party wants. It must also be clear that the information is being concealed from the other party.

(3) If it is possible to convince the party that is concealing the information, to come forth with it, that would be preferable.

(4) The information is not to be exaggerated and only that which is necessary may be told.

(5) One’s intent must be to prevent a harmful situation from coming about and not to denigrate the party spoken about. Moreover, there must be a real possibility that the information conveyed will not be ignored, so that the constructive purpose will be realized.

(6) No realistic alternative to conveying the information directly can be found.

(7) No undue harm will be caused by informing the party of the problem. Should there be reason to suspect that the party, upon learning that it has been deceived, will denigrate the other party or seek revenge in some other way, one should not get involved.

Subjective questions about people are most difficult to answer:

“Is he a talmid chacham?”“Is she intelligent?”

Each of these terms is relative, for at what point does a student of Torah become a “talmid chacham,” and how does one measure intelligence? Lack of a definitive barometer is a problem with most character traits as well, making accurate evaluations in these areas extremely difficult.

Furthermore, we have seen that one may not provide information that could prevent a match from materializing unless the information provides valid basis for this. How, then, does one correctly provide information when asked?

It is clear that it is unwise for a party to approach an acquaintance with a request for such information. In fact, the Chofetz Chaim says that such inquires warrant no response. However, one may bring such questions before a rav, rosh yeshiva, or seminary dean, etc. who has the wisdom and experience to evaluate a situation properly and offer an appropriate response. Others who are approached with such questions may direct the person to the proper authority.

Unlike the Shadchan (matchmaker) or advisor, a third party who is approached with specific questions about one of the parties is not offering advice. His primary concern, therefore, is not the sin of misleading others. His main responsibility is to be honest, and to refrain from speaking that which might constitute loshon hora.

If asked whether the other party has a specific relevant shortcoming, it is certainly correct to tell the truth. For example, if one is asked about the person’s character, and is aware that he has an uncontrollable temper, this must be told, l’toeles (for a constructive purpose). Of course, the preconditions for relating such information are required (second-hand information must be presented as such; constructive intent is required; and one may relate only that which is accurate and necessary).

If however, one is approached for information that on an objective level is irrelevant but in the eyes of this party is important, one is faced with a dilemma. To provide the information is, in effect, assisting in the unjustified abrogation of a potentially successfulshidduch. On the other hand, one does not have the right to mislead the party by way of false information, and in so doing, decide the person’s future for him without his knowledge. The Chofetz Chaim suggests that in such cases one defer by saying,” I don’t know.” (Why this does not constitute falsehood will be discussed later.)

In summation then, if, for example, an eligible young man is insistent that the woman he marries be at least four years younger than he, should never have failed an exam in elementary school, or comply with some other stipulation of seeming irrelevance, one who is asked concerning such matter should simply say, “I don’t know.” However, a shadchan may not suggest someone who does not meet these terms without first consulting a rav.

The previous rules apply to the initiator of a shidduch, employment or business partnership. Halacha classifies such a person as an advisor and requires that he not make the suggestion if he has reason to suspect that it may not be in the best interest of either party.

A similar set of rules applies to one who did not make the suggestion, but whose advice is sought by one of the parties. He too must not be guilty of misleading the people involved. In fact, his responsibility is even greater than that of the shadchan (matchmaker). Whereas the shadchan merely suggests that the shidduch be considered, the advisor often states a definitive opinion regarding the proposed relationship which may profoundly influence the party’s final decision.

Giving advice is not a matter to be taken lightly. One does not give guidance unless he believes he understands the situation, and has the insight and life experience necessary to properly direct his petitioner. One should never encourage a match he knows nothing about for the sake of seeing to it that the person “finally gets married.” One may encourage a match only if he sincerely believes that it is good for both parties.Thus, while the advisor’s first obligation is to the party he is advising, it is forbidden for him to encourage a shidduch that he clearly knows is bad for the other party. This would be considered speaking loshon hora in the form of speech that causes harm.

It is forbidden for an advisor to discourage a relationship unless his disapproval is based on firsthand information that was carefully analyzed.

Finally, if an advisor encouraged his petitioner to pursue a given shidduch but his advice was ignored, he may not draw the conclusion that the person “just doesn’t want to get married,” is “incapable of making commitments,” or has “unrealistic expectations.” To make such statements would be to speak loshon hora and perhaps hotzaas shem ra (slander).

In light of the prohibition of misleading one’s fellow (see Days 79-80), one may be reluctant to suggest shidduchim (marriage matches) altogether; others may feel it necessary to mentionevery possible shortcoming of the person so as not to be guilty of misrepresenting the truth.

Few acts of chesed (kindness) can compare with that of helping to build a Jewish home. One who thinks that a certain young man may be a suitable match for a certain young woman is not responsible to investigate the two and their families before proposing the match. That is the responsibility of the parties involved and their parents.

However, the prohibition against misleading one’s fellow requires that one not suggest a shidduch unless:
(1) He believes that given what he knows of their personalities, the two could be a good match, and he is unaware of any reason the relationship should cause pain to either one.

(2) In his opinion, there is reason to believe that their meeting will ultimately result in an engagement. (It is wrong to waste a person’s time, energy and emotions!)

(3) He is not aware of any medical, emotional, or character deficiency that would render one party unfit for marriage.

(4) He does not feel that either party will have a negative influence upon the other.

(5) He is not aware that one party lacks something that the other is insistent upon, or has something to which the other has explicitly expressed strong objection.

Should there be any doubt as to whether any of these conditions have been met; the counsel of a talmid chacham (a very learned person) should be sought.

There are times when a ravmay permit suggesting a shidduch and temporarily concealing information which could prevent the shidduch from coming about.

Occasionally, a situation exists as a result of which people might be reluctant to even consider a shidduch(3) with a particular person or family, though, in fact, the situation need not warrant such reluctance.It is in such a case that a rav may permit an initial meeting (and at times even a series of meetings) without the pertinent fact being mentioned, so that when it finally is revealed, the person stands a chance of being judged fairly.

However, it is forbidden to conceal the information until after the other party has developed strong, positive feelings concerning the shidduch, for at that point, the party will be denied the opportunity to reach an objective decision, and will have been the victim of dishonesty and manipulation.

Needless to say, such decisions are not to be made by a shadchan (matchmaker) and certainly not by the family involved. Only a qualified Torah authority should decide such matters.

We have seen that it is forbidden to attempt to involve someone in a situation that the person would not want, would he be aware of certain facts.

If an acquaintance is seeking a person with years of experience with whom to start a business, one may not recommend someone who appears to be experienced but, in fact, is not – unless the acquaintance is told this. This holds true even if the person possesses natural talent which seems to compensate for his lack of experience.

Often, people feel that they know what their friend is “really looking for” far better than the friend himself does, and feel justified in deceiving the friend by providing inaccurate information about a perspective shidduch (marriage match), or employee, with the aim of seeing the shidduch or hiring realized.

It is presumptuous and arrogant for one to think that he has the right to make others’ life decisions for them.
Furthermore, it should be understood that the human personality is complex. Logically, one may seem to have found the perfect match for his friend. Nevertheless, if one’s friend has developed an attitude – irrational though it may be – that he or she will only marry someone who meets a particular specification, hiding the truth about a prospective mate could have lifelong repercussions. Upon discovering the truth after the wedding, the person might spend the rest of is married life feeling that he settled for second best. Even if he was told the truth right before the wedding and nevertheless went through with it, feelings of disappointment might surface later.

Such practices, though well intended, constitute giving bad advice and are in violation of “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block.”

The next set of rules concerns information which, if provided, could prevent a potential relationship (e.g. business partnership, shidduch {marriage match}, hiring a worker) from materializing.

In these cases, Halachah differentiates between three situations:

(1) Where one suggests the relationship;
(2) Where one is called on to answer questions from one party concerning the other;
(3) Where one is in a position to volunteer information to either one of the parties about the other though it has not been requested.

These three situations involve different Torah commandments and therefore are to be dealt with using varying criteria.

When suggesting that someone consider entering into a relationship with someone else, one must be mindful of the commandment Lifnei ivair lo sitain michshol, Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block (Vayikra 19:14), which our Sages interpret as an admonition not to offer aitza sheaino hogenes, advice which is not proper.

It is absolutely forbidden to suggest someone as a possible employee, business partner, or marriage partner if one is aware that:

(1) Objectively speaking, it may not be good for the people involved, or
(2) it does not satisfy the subjective needs and tastes of both parties.

Not only is it cruel to subject people to situations that are bad for them, it is also wrong to involve the unsuspecting in relationships they would not have wanted had they known the facts.

Another form of constructive speech is that which prevents or breaks up a relationship that is harmful to at least one of the parties. It is correct to suggest that someone distance himself from a person or persons who may have a negative influence upon him. Similarly, it is proper to inform a parent that someone may be having a negative influence on his child. All preconditions must, of course, be fulfilled – including verification of fact constructive intent (see Days 43-50). If the information is not firsthand it may nevertheless be conveyed, provided that it is clearly being presented as secondhand information.

With regard to the requirement of accuracy of the information, the Chofetz Chaim(1) suggests that exaggeration may be permissible if that is the only way to convince the person or parent to end the relationship.

The Chofetz Chaim adds that it is imperative to explain why conveying the information does not constitute speaking loshon hora, especially when speaking to a child.

We have seen (Day 11) that it is forbidden to discuss someone’s faults even with people who are aware of these deficiencies, for to focus on a person’s weaknesses is lowly.

However, when teaching or offering guidance, one may make use of real-life illustrations of improper behavior in other people and even refer to those people by name, provided that the listeners are already familiar with the behavior of these people. The use of actual situations to which the listener can relate will deliver a message that mere discussion cannot convey. Reference to negativity here is constructive and is not considered lowly.

Therefore, it is permissible to make reference to the life-style of a non-observant Jew to emphasize weaknesses in his behavior and its consequences, though his lack of observance is rooted in ignorance. However, one should be careful not to condemn the person.

One may not use examples from the past history of a baal teshuva without his permission. Constructive intent is not a license for possible embarrassment.

It is also wrong to use examples from the lifestyles of different ethnic groups within the Jewish nation unless it is clear that neither speaker nor listener is unsympathetic towards that group.

The Talmud teaches that one is permitted to speak loshon hora about baalei machlokes, men of strife, who are at the forefront of a community feud. The purpose of speaking out against such individuals is to encourage other members of the community to dissociate themselves from them. Isolating instigators of a dispute can help restore tranquility to a community torn by strife. The undisputed rav of a community could, for example, urge his constituents to refrain from conversing with certain individuals, so as not to give them an opportunity to develop a following to create strife.

However, disparagement of one party in a dispute by the other usually results in mudslinging which further escalates the dispute. That is not at all what the Sages had in mind when they permitted speaking against baalei machlokes.

The Mishnah (Avos 5:20) contrasts machlokes l’sheim shamayim, a dispute for the sake of Heaven, with one that is not. The former is epitomized by the disputes of Hillel and Shammai whose differing views in matters of halacha, Jewish Law, are reverently studied and pondered generation after generation as eternal components of the Oral Law. The latter is epitomized by the dispute of Korach, whose personal feud against Moshe Rabbeinu earned him an untimely death and eternal dishonor. As the Chofetz Chaim notes in his preface to Sefer Chofetz Chaim, one whose sinful talk fuels strife transgresses the prohibition, “that he not be like Korach and his assembly” (Bamidbar 17:5, see Sanhedrin 110a).

To the Jew, intellectual disagreement in a common search for truth is an integral part of life. As a spiritual, thinking people, Jews are forever involved in discussion of ideas.

Conversely, personal bickering, jealousy, and competition are signs of immaturity and weakness. They have no place in the world of the Jew.

The difficulty, however, lies in our tendency to transform every dispute into an ideological one. Korach, too, came with a philosophy: that all Jews are equally holy, and thus there is no justification for one family, Aharon and his Kohanim descendants, to be above everyone else. The sages teach that Korach’s argument was rooted in jealousy, resulting from his having been passed over for the position of prince of his Levite family.Before embarking on an ideological campaign against others, one must ask himself: “Am I honestly promoting the cause of truth, or am I involved in a personal feud disguised as an ideological debate?”
Ideological disagreement should never lead to personal animosity. When Torah scholars disagree, their dispute is over ideals, and is never personal. When a scholar is involved in a dispute, his followers must be careful not to become involved in a matter that is not their own, and certainly should avoid character assassination and personal hatred towards his opponent.